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If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol).Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09MINSK106.
Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
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09MINSK106 | 2009-04-07 09:21 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY | Embassy Minsk |
VZCZCXRO1313 PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG DE RUEHSK #0106 0970921 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P R 070921Z APR 09 FM AMEMBASSY MINSK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0199 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0201
UNCLAS MINSK 000106 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR BO SUBJECT: BELARUS: INTERIOR MINISTER OUT, AT LONG LAST ¶1. (SBU) Civil society has reacted positively to the news that Interior Minister Uladzimir Navumau (Vladimir Naumov) left office April 6; he ostensibly submitted his resignation based on health concerns, but is believed to have been dismissed. Navumau, who has been in charge of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) since September 2000 and was previously head of the anti-terrorist Almaz unit (often directed against public protestors) and the Presidential Security Service, is suspected of complicity in the disappearances of several democratic opposition leaders in 1999 and 2000 and features in the EU's visa ban list. He has had a fairly public profile, on occasion appearing at independent protests together with uniformed police, where he personally exhorted the participants to disperse. ¶2. (SBU) Navumau's position was considered to be in some jeopardy since the bombing at Belarusian national day celebrations early in the morning of July 4, 2008. As was noted at that time, the fact that Belarusian KGB rather than Navumau's Ministry was initially placed in charge of the investigation was seen as a slap at Navumau and a way of making him a scapegoat for the incident. According to some local speculation, his dismissal was prompted by general ineffectiveness and outcry that MVD embarked on a nationwide campaign to fingerprint every male and female adult citizen as part of continued investigative efforts. ¶3. (SBU) It is also speculated that senior GOB circles recognize the benefit of removing a figure so reviled by persons with Euro-Atlantic values, and will try to cast the step as a further indicator of reform. ¶4. (SBU) Navumau's interim successor is Major General of Police and former Deputy Interior Minister Anatol Kulyashou. Some press are reporting that Leonid Farmagey, current head of the Minsk police and recently promoted to Major General, will be the next Minister. According to available data, Farmagey, born in 1962, joined the police in 1983. He was the deputy head of the Minsk traffic police (GAI) up to November 2000, when he was made the head of the Minsk GAI. In November 2001, he became the national head of the GAI, also serving as deputy head of the police and head of the directorate for public order. In March 2007, Farmagey became the head of the police for the Vitebsk region, and he has been in his current assignment since August 2008 (where he has evidently made a positive impression). Comment ------- ¶5. (SBU) While the GOB clearly has no intention of adequately investigating the disappearances of political opponents in 1999 and 2000, Navumau's removal, for whatever reason, is a good step. That his potential successor has a background in public police work -- albeit by post-Soviet standards -- is also an improvement over Navumau's murky record. Separately, there may be more opportunities for senior bilateral engagement with the MVD than was possible on Navumau's watch. Ultimately, the value of Navumau's departure from office as a possible sign of reform will be affirmed if it is matched by other positive steps by the GOB. MOORE
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